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Can Tax Agents Support Tax Compliance in Low-Income Countries? A 
Review of the Literature and some Preliminary Evidence from Uganda 
 





Over the last 40 years there has been an increased focus on the role that tax agents play in 
ensuring or deterring compliance with tax obligations. While the literature on their role is not 
extensive, a variety of different topics have been explored. Some consistent evidence has 
emerged indicating when agents improve (or decrease) compliance, as well as the key 
drivers of their use by taxpayers. However, virtually all existing studies have focused on high- 
or upper-middle-income countries. Given that the tax systems of low-income countries 
present a unique set of compliance issues, a more in-depth analysis of the role that tax 
agents might play in these contexts is warranted. In this paper, we provide an extensive 
review of existing literature on tax agents, and present some preliminary evidence from two 
surveys on their use in Uganda. Our results show that tax agents seem to contribute to an 
improvement in the quality of filed returns and to lower audit adjustments, hence supporting 
improved compliance. The type of services more frequently requested by taxpayers seem to 
match those in high-income countries, as do their reasons for engaging tax agents in the first 
place. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Since the late 1970s, many countries have based their tax systems on self-assessment – 
taxpayers are expected to evaluate their liabilities autonomously, and voluntarily remit their 
tax due. If the tax system is perceived as fair and easy to navigate, with credible threat of 
penalisation for non-compliance, self-assessment reduces the cost of tax administration 
without significant revenue losses (Barr et al. 1977; Teviotdale and Thompson 1999; James 
and Alley 2004). On the other hand, self-assessment entails an increase in compliance costs 
for taxpayers, at the very least in terms of time spent complying with their obligations. 
However, none of the conditions mentioned above – fairness, simplicity and credibility – is 
easy to meet. Hence, initial moves towards self-assessment were met in many countries with 
an increased focus on what type of deterrence measures would increase taxpayer 
compliance (Forest and Sheffrin 2002), following the prevalent theoretical approach of the 
time (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). By the late 1990s, the focus was shifting to the 
perceived fairness and complexity of the tax system, increasingly seen as both a direct and 
indirect obstacle to compliance (Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002; Forest and Sheffrin 2002; 
Eichfelder and Schorn 2012). Intuitively, a taxpayer who does not understand their tax 
obligations has a hard time complying with them, and might well decide not to try at all – 
especially if penalisation is seen as unlikely. 
 
A potential solution for taxpayers who are struggling to understand their tax obligations, but 
intend to comply with them, is to hire a tax agent.1 This seems to have quickly become 
common: some of the first studies addressing issues of compliance costs with income tax in 
the United States found evidence that almost half of all taxpayers analysed hired a tax agent 
to prepare their tax return (Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Slemrod 1989). As the relevance of 
professional tax preparation in the US became more evident, some academics started 
studying the determinants of use of tax agents (Long and Caudill 1987), as well as the role 
they could play in either promoting or deterring compliance (Kaplan et al. 1988; Klepper and 
Nagin 1989). Despite the potentially important function that tax agents play in various 
countries, the study of their role within a tax system never gained much traction. Some 
further interest came in the late 2000s, as aggressive tax planning, usually involving tax 
agents, was seen as depriving countries of the revenue needed to pay for the financial crisis 
(OECD 2008). However, even in this case interest was short-lived. A recent review of 
research on tax compliance issues by one of the leading academics in the sector pointed out 
that the role of tax agents is still under-researched, and more empirical investigation is 
required (Slemrod 2019). 
 
Most of the scant evidence on the role of tax agents comes from high-income countries 
(HICs), especially the US and Australia. There are only a few studies considering their role in 
a couple of upper-middle-income countries – South Africa (Lubbe and Nienaber 2012), and 
Malaysia (Isa et al. 2014; Sapiei and Kasipillai 2014; Sinnasamy et al. 2015). However, there 
is no reason to assume that tax agents could not be playing an important, if maybe different, 
role in taxpayer compliance in lower-middle- or low-income countries. Early research on the 
role of tax agents focused on their use by small and medium businesses (Hite et al. 1992), 
which are usually the majority of registered taxpayers in low-income countries (LICs) as well 
as HICs. Furthermore, while personal income taxes are currently paid by only a small fraction 
of the population in LICs, and account for a low proportion of revenue raised (Moore and 
Prichard 2017), this might be slowly changing. The recent focus of some revenue 
administrations in LICs on the taxation of high net worth individuals (Kangave et al. 2016; 
 
1  Throughout the paper we use the term ‘tax agents’. as this is more often used in Uganda. However, tax professionals, 
tax preparers and tax consultants are also fairly common in the literature. 
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Kangave et al. 2018; Kangave et al. 2020), with more starting to consider a similar strategy, 
might soon lead to a greater use of tax agents by private individuals. Finally, recent work in 
the US has highlighted the role that tax agents can play in increasing their clients’ knowledge 
of the tax system (Chetty and Saez 2013). Given how important outreach to taxpayers has 
become for revenue administrations in many LICs, it is important to understand whether LICs 
might try to pursue similar strategies. 
 
Against this background, this paper presents some initial evidence on the use and regulation 
of tax agents in Uganda. This is an interesting case study for three main reasons. First, a 
recent study found that the high level of duplication of contact information in the taxpayer 
registry is due to the widespread practice of tax agents giving their own contact information 
when assisting with business registration (Mayega et al. 2019). Second, the Uganda 
Revenue Authority (URA) was one of the first African revenue authorities to engage with the 
taxation of high net worth individuals. After impressive initial results (Kangave et al. 2016), 
revenue accruing from this category of taxpayers has plateaued. While there is currently little 
evidence on why this is the case, one plausible reason might be an increase in tax planning, 
implying a higher involvement of tax professionals. Finally, many Ugandan taxpayers, and 
especially individuals, find it extremely difficult to comply with their filing obligations, and to 
interact with the URA to either amend their return or appeal against objections (Waiswa et al. 
2020). The literature shows that these activities often lead taxpayers to hire the services of a 
tax agent (Long and Caudill 1987).  
 
We conducted two separate self-administered surveys to provide some initial evidence on 
the role that tax agents play in Uganda. The first targeted URA tax officials, to get a better 
understanding of the interaction between tax officers and tax agents. The second covered 
tax agents, in order to gather information about their professional status, client base and the 
type of services they most regularly provide. These surveys are complemented by in-depth 
interviews with various members of the URA Tax Agents Registration Committee secretariat, 
which oversees the accreditation of tax professionals by the revenue authority. Our results 
suggest that, in line with the experience of HICs, various categories of taxpayers rely on tax 
agents to ensure that they are complying with their tax obligations, which many find difficult 
to understand. Reducing tax liability is mentioned, but seems to be less relevant in pushing 
taxpayers to look for the services of an agent. Both URA staff and tax agents confirm the 
relevance of their acting as intermediatries when taxpayers are asked to respond to queries 
from the URA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to assess the role of tax 
agents in an LIC. While it is only a preliminary study, it already has some consequences for 
policy. First, it shows that tax authorities should give proper consideration to regulating the 
use of tax agents, to ensure they provide services of a high standard – which is in the 
interest of both the authorities and taxpayers. Second, it highlights that tax agents contribute 
to taxpayers’ understanding of tax systems, and may be useful in outreach activities. Finally, 
given the demand to minimise tax due, it may be worth seeing tax agents as a useful 
intermediary with whom to share tax rulings and interact with on a regular basis to clarify any 
potential ambiguity in the tax code. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an extensive review of existing 
literature on the role of tax agents in high- and upper-middle-income countries. Section 3 
discusses compliance issues in Uganda. Section 4 provides a brief overview of recent 
policies that the URA implemented to increase domestic revenue mobilisation and the role 
tax agents might play in them. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the surveys, 




2  Literature review 
 
Given the widespread use of professional tax services, the academic literature on tax agents 
is not particularly extensive. The majority of studies reviewed come from the fields of 
economics and accountancy; a couple come from law. The following sections try to show 
how studying the role of tax agents in taxpayer compliance has evolved over time. There is 
more discussion of earlier studies, due to their role in influencing research theories and 
methods in this area. In subsequent sections, specific studies that either produced new 
evidence or relied on more interesting data sources are given more relevance.  
 
2.1 Why taxpayers hire tax agents and the role of tax agents in compliance – 
1984 to 1992 
 
As mentioned earlier, findings from two studies conducted by Slemrod in the mid-1980s 
(Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Slemrod 1989) sparked initial interest in the effect that using tax 
agents had on compliance. The primary concern of both of these works was to assess how 
expensive it is for US taxpayers to comply with the personal income tax system, and how its 
simplification might affect these costs. Analysing 600 responses from randomly selected 
taxpayers from Minnesota, the authors found that 45.9 per cent used the service of a 
professional tax agent before submitting their returns (Slemrod and Sorum 1984). Not 
surprisingly, the agents’ charges for preparing returns accounted for a significant proportion 
of the compliance cost. A potential reduction in their use could be a large proportion of 
possible long-term savings coming from simplification of the tax system (Slemrod 1989). 
Furthermore, their figure for use of agents closely matched that reported by the Internal 
Revenue System (IRS) for the 1979 round of their Taxpayers Compliance Measurement 
Program (44%), proving that a significant use of agents had been a stable feature of the US 
tax system for a while.  
 
While neither study directly intended to identify the reasons behind a decision to hire a tax 
agent, as a by-product of their analysis the authors provided a first account of taxpayer 
characteristics associated with their use. Again somewhat unsurprisingly, use of agents 
increased with taxpayer age, their marginal tax rate, their level of income, and when income 
from self-employment and capital gains were more relevant (Slemrod and Sorum 1984; 
Slemrod 1989).  
 
The significance of all of these variables in determining which type of taxpayer was more 
likely to use tax agents was confirmed around the same period. Long and Caudill (1987) 
author the first study to address the question directly, employing a combination of logit, tobit 
and Heckman’s selection models on more than 120,000 US personal income tax returns. 
The authors found that demographic characteristics relevant for taxpayers’ qualification for 
particular deductions were only partially significant in explaining their decision to hire an 
agent.2 Given the higher prevalence of the use of agents amongst taxpayers claiming 
itemised deductions, the authors conclude that it was the overall complexity of the return 
itself that motivated expenditure on a professional tax agent. Furthermore, the authors 
provide some initial evidence that, within the same income bracket, returns filed with support 
from tax agents are associated with lower liabilities than those self-filed for all but the highest 
and lowest income groups (Long and Caudill 1987). 
 
Three other relevant studies were published in the late 1980s, all looking at one question 
strongly related to the above finding – how the use of tax agents affect taxpayer compliance. 
 
2  For example, marital status, seniority and number of dependants. 
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Two of them, Kaplan et al. (1988) and Ayres et al. (1989), share an approach that was to 
become a staple in the literature on tax agents – comparing the advice that different tax 
agents give when presented with hypothetical tax cases subjected to random variation. The 
last, Klepper and Nagin (1989), is based on aggregate information from 50,000 individual 
income tax returns from the 1982 round of the IRS Tax Compliance Measurement Program. 
Thanks to a more formal presentation of the theory behind impact of agents on compliance, 
this study was to have a stronger impact on the literature.  
 
Kaplan et al. (1988) assess how the type and breadth of a tax agent’s experiences might 
influence the advice that they provide to their clients in unambiguous and ambiguous tax 
matters. The authors hypothesise that previous experience should not have an impact on the 
type of advice that agents give on unambiguous tax matters. In this case the law offers a 
clear interpretation, and suggestions to clients should only be impacted by the probability of 
detection of non-compliance. On the other hand, the experience of tax agents should 
influence what they suggest in ambiguous cases. More experienced agents are more likely to 
have a standard position regarding ambiguous situations, developed through multiple 
interactions with the IRS. Conversely, less experienced tax agents will more often be guided 
by their clients’ attitude to risk. Prior successful interactions with the IRS will also lead to 
more aggressive positions in both groups. To test these hypotheses, the authors submitted 4 
theoretical tax scenarios to 52 tax agents with different levels of prior experience working for 
the biggest international accounting firms, randomly manipulating the probability of audit and 
the loss incurred if found in breach of the law. Relevant support was found for all the 
hypotheses. For unambiguous tax matters, all agents had a ‘lottery’ approach – they took a 
more aggressive position when probability of detection and penalties were lower, and level of 
experience did not play a significant role. In ambiguous situations, the probability of audit 
was only a significant predictor of aggressiveness with tax positions for less experienced tax 
agents. Finally, positive outcomes in previous tax rulings from the IRS led to more 
aggressiveness in both groups of agents. While the authors recognise both that the selection 
of tax agents was neither made at random nor necessarily representative, and that all 
hypothetical scenarios came from the same field, the results still highlight some plausible 
decision patterns. 
 
In a related study, Ayres et al. (1989) compare tax advice between agents who are certified 
public accountants (CPA), and those without any professional affiliation. While CPA 
certification is not required to offer paid tax advice services, certified tax agents do have 
certain advantages. Due to IRS regulation, only agents qualified as certified accountants, 
lawyers, or those who have obtained official accreditation, have the right to represent their 
clients before the IRS. Furthermore, when a tax position is denied upon audit, as long as a 
CPA agent can demonstrate the existence of a substantial basis for it, penalties are usually 
waived, and their clients only pay the difference in assessed liabilities. These considerations 
led the authors to hypothesise that CPA agents would be more likely to take a pro-taxpayer 
position when reporting on ambiguous items than non-CPA agents. To test this, 168 agents 
with and without CPA affiliation were asked to declare which of the same set of 6 different 
suggestions they would give to their client for the same 5 different hypothetical tax scenarios. 
While the data provided strong support for their hypothesis, the authors also recognise that 
their results could have been driven by two factors they did not explicitly take into account. 
The first is a systematic difference in clientele types between CPA and non-affiliated agents; 
the second a systematic difference in level of prior training and experience. The latter might 
lead CPA agents to have a better feeling for what positions have a sound enough legal basis 
to be acceptable to the IRS. The former might imply that they usually deal with taxpayers that 
have a higher risk appetite to start with.  
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The work presented in Klepper and Nagin (1989), while closely related to the above studies, 
takes a different and more data-driven approach. To start with, rather than leaving the 
distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous items to be intuitive, a formal ambiguity 
index was constructed. For each line item of a tax return, the index was obtained by 
combining the number of connected revenue rulings from the IRS with the relevance of 
monetary value imputed in its liability calculation (eg evaluation of loss due to theft, or in-kind 
charity donation). Secondly, instead of suggesting hypothetical scenarios, the impact of 
agents was calculated by comparing average voluntary reporting percentages for different 
classes of taxpayers.3 Finally, thanks to a specific outreach programme to increase 
compliance with expected personal income tax implemented in Pennsylvania in 1984, the 
authors were able to formally test if agents react to signals of increased attention on specific 
issues from the IRS. This hypothesis was verified by assessing the likelihood that taxpayers 
using agents would become first-time payers of that tax in that particular year. While 
admittedly very reliant on auditors’ judgements, their analysis provided strong evidence that 
tax agents play a double role with regard to compliance. They increase taxpayer compliance 
with legislation whose interpretation is unambiguous or which is signalled as a priority by the 
revenue authority, while contemporaneously exploiting existing room to decrease clients’ 
liabilities from sources whose legal treatment is ambiguous. 
 
Hite et al. (1992) is the last study from the initial wave deserving extensive treatment, as it 
produced the first evidence on the reasons for small business owners to engage the services 
of a tax agent, as well as assessing the position they would like their agents to take on 
ambiguous items. Analysing 300 valid responses received from 1,500 small businesses 
contacted, the authors show that their first reason for engaging tax agents is to ensure that 
returns are correctly compiled, followed by reducing potential penalties, with tax minimisation 
only third on the list of priorities. While more than a third of respondents admitted to some 
form of non-compliance in the past, this does not seem to correspond to an appetite for 
aggressive declarations of ambiguous sources. In fact, business owners were happy for their 
agents to minimise liabilities on dubious items only when they had a 70 per cent confidence 
that the IRS would agree with such a position. Furthermore, the majority of respondents 
wanted to be in control of the final decision on what to declare on ambiguous items, with no 
evidence of correlation between the said preference and appetite for aggressive reporting or 
prior non-compliance. 
 
Several important elements of the role of tax agents in the US tax system started to be 
determined through this first wave of studies. By the early 1990s, it was clear that the use of 
agents had been widespread for over a decade, with important consequences on the cost of 
taxpayer compliance. While the use of agents was common across all categories of 
taxpayers, it rose with their income level and with the complexity of their tax return, which 
was in part associated with their sources of income. The use of agents was associated with 
higher compliance on unambiguous tax rules, and more aggressive tax reporting on 
ambiguous ones. Both of these decisions were influenced by agents’ experience in dealing 
with the IRS, and, relatedly, by their professional qualification in what already appeared a 
segmented market. However, it also seemed that, at least amongst certain taxpayer 
categories, willingness to be compliant with the tax system and to avoid penalties was a 
much more important reason to engage their services than minimising tax liability. 
 
2.2 The 1990s – consolidation of the early evidence 
 
Much of the work on tax agents during the 1990s aimed to refine initial findings on their role, 
using similar methods and data. Evidence showed that the effort to simplify the US tax 
 
3  This is defined as the ratio between liabilities voluntarily disclosed and those assessed by the auditors through the 
Taxpayers Compliance Measurement Program. 
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system and reduce compliance cost in the mid-1980s did not lead to the expected long-run 
decrease in use of agents (Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992). Other studies show that high-
income taxpayers are more likely to engage tax agents to exploit ambiguity in tax legislation 
(Klepper et al. 1991). Credible threat of sanctions from the tax authority on agents was 
demonstrated to reduce their willingness to sign returns with aggressive deductions 
(Newberry et al. 1993), with an appetite for the latter seemingly connected with taxpayers’ 
positive liabilities after withholding tax (Schisler 1994). Others showed that particular 
taxpayer characteristics are significant predictors of use of a CPA agent, while also 
demonstrating how this category of agent leads to much higher non-compliance on 
ambiguous items than those without an explicit professional affiliation (Erard 1993).  
 
Further support for the claim that ensuring compliance with obligations prevails as a reason 
to engage tax agents came from New Zealand, where a researcher surveyed close to 700 
taxpayers, predominantly small business owners (Tan 1999). Using the ‘hypothetical tax 
scenario’ approach, their results showed that if there were serious disagreements on 
reporting positions, taxpayers would have no qualms in terminating the relationship with their 
tax agent. Somehow surprisingly, the same preference for conservative tax advice was 
reported in a large survey of Australian taxpayers who had been involved in different mass-
marketed tax planning schemes, popular in the country during the 1990s (Murphy and Byng 
2002). Some work started investigating potential discrepancies between what taxpayers 
expected to receive from their tax agents, and what the latter imagined the main focus of 
their clients to be (Christensen 1992). The effect of confirmation bias on the ability of tax 
agents to assess the validity of their positions on ambiguous items also received some 
attention (Cloyd and Spilker 1999).  
 
As more evidence started accumulating on the heterogeneity of the impact of agents across 
their different qualifications, some authors explicitly considered the role that state regulation 
of tax professionals could play. Assessing the experience of various countries, Thuronyi and 
Vanistendael (1996) argue that regulation should strive to find the appropriate balance 
between ensuring the loyalty of tax agents towards the general tax system, and towards their 
client. Protecting the latter from receiving bad service – a theme previously covered with 
specific reference to the US system in the late 1980s (Jackson et al. 1988; Jackson and 
Milliron 1989) – was seen as one of the main aims of regulation. No single approach seemed 
to have prevailed across the countries considered, as there were a variety of different 
professional figures providing tax services, many of which had their own regulatory body. 
Although usually accountants, auditors and lawyers worked as tax agents in the countries 
studied, the nature of the tax services they provided varied greatly depending on the tax 
system. The authors also consider what type of regulation could better fit transition 
economies, concluding that a simple definition of the right of taxpayers to use a 
representative, as well as the consequences of such a decision, was probably all that was 
required, given how little depth there was likely to be to the tax service markets.  
 
2.3 The Australian experience – the early 2000s  
 
The most interesting studies on the role of tax agents within a tax system in the early 2000s 
came from Australia, where in 1998 the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) decided to legally 
pursue tens of thousands of taxpayers that had become involved in tax planning schemes 
during the 1990s. Initial resistance by taxpayers to the ATO request to pay significant arrears 
led to a surge in interest in the topic of tax compliance, and a few large surveys were 
published (Braithwaite 2001; Murphy 2002; Murphy and Byng 2002). A study relying on one 
such survey, Niemirowski et al. (2003), aims to acquire a general understanding of 
compliance behaviour among Australian taxpayers, as well as their attitude towards, and 
beliefs about, the tax system. The authors ran an extensive survey covering more than 1,000 
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taxpayers across different risk profiles, matching survey responses with actual returns, as 
well as sampling more than 300 Australian Tax Officers and 60 tax agents. Results from the 
latter group revealed how Australian tax agents felt that their clients delegated the ‘moral 
responsibility’ of finding the right amount of minimisation to them, hence maintaining the high 
ground towards the acceptability of tax avoidance schemes. Agents generally held very 
strong views about the seriousness of tax evasion, while also representing the only group 
tolerating a high level of tax avoidance. This tolerance was connected to the perception that 
the tax system did not ensure fair treatment of all taxpayers, so tax planning was the only 
way to ensure that some clients had enough funds for retirement. The vast majority also 
agreed that their clients would lie about tax matters, and approximately half reported having 
been threatened with dismissal if they did not followed their clients’ exact instructions. As a 
consequence, most agents felt that they could perceive which of their clients were likely to 
incur reporting issues, and over half of them had previously decided to stop providing 
services to particular clients.  
 
Another survey from the same period targeted close to 8,000 randomly selected Australian 
taxpayers, asking a variety of questions related to their tax knowledge, perception of the tax 
system and relationship with tax professionals. While only about 2,000 responses were 
received (29% of the targeted sample), the overall distribution of respondents’ characteristics 
seemed to be representative of the overall population (Mearns and Braithwaite 2001). Two 
studies used this data to investigate different aspects of the relationship between taxpayers 
and tax agents. The first, conducted by one of the survey’s authors, aimed to provide more 
evidence for the hypothesis that tax agents work in a segmented market, and to assess how 
easily taxpayers can find the type of agents they are looking for (Sakurai and Braithwaite 
2003). Apart from confirming that the vast majority of respondents used a tax agent (77%), 
their study supported the finding that most taxpayers have a preference for agents taking low 
risk positions, minimising liabilities when it is safe to do so. However, there also exists a 
significant minority (26.42%) who actively look for agents versed in aggressive tax planning 
and are capable of building complex tax minimisation strategies, with an understanding that 
this might make conflict with the tax authority more likely.4 Generally, it also seems that a 
majority of respondents could find a tax agent matching their preferred approach to tax 
reporting. The second study, Murphy (2003), focused explicitly on the minority of 
respondents who stated a preference for a tax agent versed in creative accounting, trying to 
ascertain if they shared some common characteristics. The analysis revealed that the 
majority of them are younger, less educated and earning more than the average survey 
respondents. Unsurprisingly, they also have a generally lax attitude towards tax compliance 
– not only thinking that there is nothing wrong with tax evasion, but that it is actually the 
smart thing to do.  
 
The role that regulation might play in ensuring minimum technical and ethical standards was 
also studied – an extensive modification of the Australian tax agents’ code, aimed at curbing 
the proliferation of tax minimisation schemes, was at the time under discussion. To better 
understand the effect that regulatory requirements played in the agents’ market, McKerchar 
et al. (2008) exploit the difference between the strict regulation in the state of Oregon and the 
much laxer one in the rest of the US. While the authors recognise that US tax agents are not 
necessarily representative of their Australian counterparts, no data was available to explore 
this relationship within Australia. Assessing potential discrepancies across different income 
sources, calculation errors and audit results across the two geographical groups, the authors 
conclude that higher qualification requirements for tax agents are associated with higher 
 
4  While there are known issues with self-reported answers about potentially sensitive topics, the fact that more than a 
quarter of respondents expressed a preference for aggressive tax planning seems to indicate a certain degree of 
openness with regard to this tax attitude in Australia. 
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voluntary disclosure rates and more accurate returns. These findings indicate that the 
Australian reform was probably moving in the right direction.  
 
This second wave of studies coming out of Australia expanded the body of evidence that had 
emerged in the US over the previous two decades, showing that many of the original results 
were holding in a country that has both similarities and differences. Even in the Australian 
context, the use of tax agents is widespread amongst taxpayers (Mearns and Braithwaite 
2001), and the vast majority of them are mainly looking to ensure that their return is correct 
and prefer a more conservative position. Some tax minimisation was often requested, but 
only a minority of taxpayers were actively looking to exploit as many grey areas as possible 
(Sakurai and Braithwaite 2003). While this category could find tax agents willing to support 
them (Murphy 2003), the majority of the profession preferred to avoid engaging with clients 
who were likely to be found in non-compliant positions (Niemirowski et al. 2003). Over this 
period, more research on the discrepancy between taxpayers’ motivation to hire agents and 
the latters’ perception of the services requested from them also took place in the US, but did 
not add anything substantially novel to the literature (Stephenson 2007, 2010). 
 
2.4 The 2008 financial crisis and recent literature 
 
The topic of professional tax services has received increasing attention during the last 
decade due to growing awareness of the detrimental impact of transfer pricing and other 
international tax planning schemes. An OECD study on the role of tax agents in aggressive 
tax planning concludes that these activities are usually demand-led, and that the vast 
majority of big corporate taxpayers have enough in-house capacity to set their own tax 
strategy without consulting external tax agents (OECD 2008). Subsequently, information 
leaks, such as the ‘Panama papers’ in 2016 and ‘Paradise papers’ in 2017, and the clear 
indication of the role that various types of tax agents played, once again convinced some 
authorities that more regulation of tax advisory services was required (Roxan et al. 2017). In 
2017 the EU adopted a specific legislation, implemented in the summer of 2020, obliging all 
tax intermediaries to declare all cross-border tax arrangements within its border (Remeur 
2018). 
 
While some studies in this period continued developing the same themes of the previous 
literature, others started exploring new directions. In the first group, authors focused on 
different perception of priorities between agents and clients (Fleischman and Stephenson 
2012; Tan 2014; Stephenson et al. 2017), or on determinants of client satisfaction with the 
services received (Gupta 2015; Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer 2015). In the second, they 
drew bridges between competing theoretical approaches on the practice of tax agents, 
looking for a unifying theory (Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler 2015), or focusing on the 
lobbying power of in-house tax agents of digital multinational corporations and their capacity 
to strongly influence regulation of their sectors (Mulligan and Oats 2016). The interaction 
between corporate actors, tax agents and tax authorities was also the explicit focus of a 
study providing critical insights into how tax knowledge is created, shared and implemented 
in the UK (Hasseldine et al. 2011). The authors support the view that it is in the best interest 
of tax agents to be seen as reliable partners by both their corporate clients and HMRC, as 
this allows them to play both the role of enforcer and exploiter of rules. However, this also 
puts them in the spotlight of both corporate and institutional organisations, which perceive 
these conflicting roles and – especially from the corporate side – might fear that the 
knowledge flows between different links of this chain does not favour them. 
 
More empirical work, combining administrative data with tax agent surveys, also emerged in 
the US. Two examples are worth mentioning. The first, Chetty and Saez (2013), focuses on 
the educational role of tax agents. The authors assess the impact of a short explanation of 
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the mechanism behind the Earned Income Tax Credit – the largest cash transfer programme 
in the US – on labour supply decisions of half of 43,000 randomly selected clients of a large 
tax advisory firm. While they found that their treatment only had a marginal effect in 
incentivising clients towards the ‘optimal’ labour supply, there was evidence of heterogeneity 
of effects across different types of tax agents. This led them to hypothesise that supporting 
particular type of tax advisors could be a more effective way to increase the scheme’s 
effectiveness than a blanket information campaign – while also further demonstrating that 
agents’ characteristics matter for their impact, even within the same firm. The second study, 
Zwick (2018), explores if a difference in the quality of tax agents hired could explain the low 
take-up (37%) of carry-back refunds in the US.5 By exploiting exogenous switches in tax 
agents to identify their impact on client behaviour, the author discovers that agent 
sophistication – measured by academic qualification and professional body affiliation – is a 
significant and consistent predictor of refund take-up, especially for small and medium firms. 
 
We conclude the review with the limited number of studies assessing the role of tax agents in 
upper-middle-income countries rather than HICs, on which all of the prior literature was 
based. A few studies emerged in the early 2010s to verify if some of the claims made about 
the role of tax agents in HICs could be valid for Malaysia, which moved to a self-assessment 
system in 2004. While not as technically advanced as other work from this period, these 
studies – which only focus on corporate taxpayers and their agents – provide suggestive 
evidence that the complexity of the Malaysian tax system was the main reason to employ a 
tax agent, although tax planning usually followed closely (Isa et al. 2014; Sapiei 
and Kasipillai 2014). 
 
Lubbe and Nienaber (2012) provide the only example of a study from a country in the African 
continent, South Africa. In 2005, an amendment to the Revenue Law made it compulsory for 
all tax agents to register with the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and to seek 
accreditation with a soon-to-be-established professional body. While this led to almost 
23,000 agents registering with SARS, the institution of their regulatory body, started in 2008, 
had not been completed when the study took place.6 In the authors’ opinion, this left room for 
potentially aggressive tax reporting to persist, as agents were not subjected to any explicit 
code of conduct. Given that SARS reported that in 2004 more than 90 per cent of small 
businesses outsourced completion of their tax returns, the authors decided to verify if this 
was mostly due to fear of penalties following a reporting error, or to a desire to minimise their 
tax bill. A replication of the experiment run by Tan (1999) with 50 business owners showed 
that, even in South Africa, obtaining an accurate return and minimising the probability of audit 
were more important reasons to seek the services of a tax agent than tax minimisation. 
However, despite the fact that the majority of respondents claimed to favour conservative 
advice, a choice-experiment revealed a preference for aggressive reporting on ambiguous 
items by the majority of respondents.  
 
2.5 Literature summary 
 
As the above review demonstrates, the role of tax agents within the tax system of a reduced 
number of HICs has drawn some attention for 40 years. However, over this period, only a 
limited number of topics have actively been investigated. Quite a few authors have tried to 
determine the main characteristics of taxpayers seeking to employ an agent, and the 
 
5  These are refunds that can be claimed by applying current losses against previous taxable income. 
6  The creation of a new professional body was dropped in 2013. It was instead decided that the Institute of Accounting 
and Commerce, the South African Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, the South African Institute of Professional Accountants and the South African Institute of Tax 
Practitioners would be the recognised controlling bodies. See https://www.gov.za/recognition-controlling-bodies-tax-
practitioners.  
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services most often requested. The use of agents seems to be pervasive in the US (Slemrod 
and Sorum 1984; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992), New Zealand (Tan 1999), Australia 
(Mearns and Braithwaite 2001; Sakurai and Braithwaite 2003), and it has more recently been 
shown as relevant in South Africa (Lubbe and Nienaber 2012). The complexity of complying 
with tax legislation seems to be one of the main drivers for their employment (Long and 
Caudill 1987; Isa et al. 2014), and most taxpayers engaging their services seem to do so 
chiefly to ensure that they are compliant with their obligations (Hite et al. 1992; Tan 1999; 
Sakurai and Braithwaite 2003). However, there is also often a desire to reduce tax liabilities, 
although how aggressively depends on both geographical context (Hite et al. 1992; Sakurai 
and Braithwaite 2003; Lubbe and Nienaber 2012) and taxpayer characteristics (Klepper et al. 
1991; Erard 1993; Schisler 1994; Murphy 2003). 
 
The desire of taxpayers to both follow tax legislation and reduce their tax liability also led 
different authors to study the general impact of tax agents on taxpayer compliance. Since 
seminal work in the late 1980s, it has been established that agents indeed play a double role, 
increasing compliance with unambiguous legislation, but also exploiting ambiguous 
provisions to minimise their clients’ liabilities (Kaplan et al. 1988; Ayres et al. 1988; Klepper 
and Nagin 1989). How successfully they defend their clients’ interest in front of the tax 
authority seems to depend on their professional background, with lawyers and CPAs 
generally willing to take more risk when they feel that their position has a substantial basis 
(Kaplan et al. 1988; Ayres et al. 1989; Erard 1993). Professional qualifications and 
experience with particular categories of clients has also recently been shown to impact the 
capacity of agents to explain to their clients what could be in their best interest (Chetty and 
Saez 2013) and how to exploit lesser known tax provisions (Zwick 2018). Given the role of 
tax agents as knowledge intermediaries between tax authorities and taxpayers (Hasseldine 
et al. 2011) and their ability to lobby for favourable legislation in particular industries 
(Mulligan and Oats 2016), their professional regulation has also received some interest. 
While the professional background of a tax agent varies greatly across countries (Thuronyi 
and Vanistendael 1996), a balance has to be found on how strict entry requirements should 
be. While requiring a high academic qualification to enter the market increases accuracy of 
returns (McKerchar et al. 2008), the literature also shows that more qualified agents are 
more likely to take an aggressive position. Striking the right balance between a regulation 
ensuring taxpayer confidentiality and one that protects the integrity of the tax systems has 
also proven complex, and was until recently subject to some institutional scrutiny (Roxan et 
al. 2017; Remeur 2018). 
 
From a methodological point of view, studies assessing the role of tax agents in the tax 
system have generally relied on a combination of different strategies. Those looking at 
taxpayer preferences for different types of agents have often based their results on mailed 
questionnaires (Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Slemrod 1989; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; 
Sakurai and Braithwaite 2003; Murphy 2003), which at the time included an experimental 
component (Hite et al. 1992; Tan 1999; Lubbe and Nienaber 2012), and in one case analysis 
of tax returns (Niemirowski et al. 2003). Studies that investigated what agent characteristics 
impact the type of advice provided have normally employed assessments of hypothetical tax 
scenarios subjected to some variation in probabilities of audits and penalties (Kaplan et al. 
1988; Ayres et al. 1989; Schisler 1994), or on the analysis of unaudited (Long and Caudill 
1987) and audited tax returns (Klepper and Nagin 1989; Klepper et al. 1991; Erard 1993; 
McKerchar et al. 2008). More recent studies have been set up in an experimental framework, 
either as randomised controlled trials (Chetty and Saez 2013), or as natural experiments 




3  Domestic resource mobilisation and 
compliance issues in Uganda 
 
In this section, we briefly present the current domestic resource mobilisation context in 
Uganda, highlighting some compliance issues that the URA still faces, while drawing from 
the previous review to see what role tax agents might play in reducing or exacerbating these 
issues. The tax-to-GDP ratio in Uganda has increased by 2.8 percentage points between 
2014 and 2019, reaching 12.5 per cent in 2019 – enough to cover 44 per cent of the national 
budget (MOFPED 2019). Collection was close to – but never reached – what was targeted 
for every year between 2016 and 2018, with the under-performance mostly concentrated in 
domestic taxes. There have long been suspicions of widespread evasion and non-
compliance with tax obligations in the country, especially for those income taxes where 
liabilities are determined uniquely through self-assessment. Both corporate and personal 
income taxes account for a relatively low share of total revenue collection – 6 per cent the 
former and 17 per cent the latter – especially when compared with their average contribution 
in other East African countries (Waiswa et al. 2020). 
 
Many reasons have been mentioned for this non-compliance, ranging from lack of 
adequately trained personnel at the URA to the existence of an extensive informal sector,7 
from poor bookkeeping practices by the majority of businesses to the complexity of the tax 
system. Especially the latter seems to play a significant role. A recent study reports that a 
significant share of taxpayers find both filing and amending returns, as well as responding to 
queries from the URA and appealing its decision, extremely complicated (Waiswa et al. 
2020). Various URA annual reports between 2016 and 2019 identify the low quality and 
inaccuracy of returns submitted as a serious threat to revenue collection, for which urgent 
action was needed. It is fairly likely that the complexity of both the tax legislation and the 
return form could be two of the reasons.  
 
Waiswa et al. (2020) report that paying taxes and registering for a taxpayer identification 
number (TIN) were the only two activities which taxpayers found easy to execute. However, 
other recent work in the country highlights serious issues with the information that taxpayers 
provide at the point of registration (Mayega et al. 2019). The authors of the study discover 
very frequent duplication of both email and telephone numbers for a variety of taxpayers, and 
infer that this is due to tax agents providing their own details instead of their client’s at the 
moment of registration. The authors believe this practice arises both because of a 
requirement to provide an email address to register, which many taxpayers might not have, 
and tax agents wanting to keep control over their client’s return in order to demand more 
frequent payment. 
 
Given these issues, it is not surprising that the URA has over the years stepped up its work 
to facilitate tax compliance, recognising that tax authorities have to see themselves as 
service providers. This has taken a variety of different forms:  
 
• many tax services have been automated, reducing the need to travel to tax offices;  
• taxpayer education campaigns, aiming to clarify tax obligations, have been frequent and 
used different media, targeting different stakeholders;  
 
7  While the existence of an extensive informal sector does pose important challenges to a tax system, it is also important 
to recognise that the potential revenue contribution of many informal businesses is likely to be minimal or inexistent. For 
a recent discussion of the focus of many African revenue authorities on registering informal businesses, see Moore 
(2020).  
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• the number of tax offices has increased, to facilitate access in more remote areas of the 
country; and  
• welfare improvement programmes have been directed to URA staff, to improve morale 
and the quality of services provided.  
 
While all these activities have helped increase voluntary compliance, there is scope to 
continue improving them (Waiswa et al. 2020). 
 
However, most attention should be directed towards improving enforcement action– the other 
half of compliance improvement strategies, which is recognised to be a real weak point for 
the URA (Waiswa et al. 2020). Existing evidence points towards a variety of different areas in 
need of more attention. Between 2014 and 2018 the URA completed approximately 10,000 
audits from a population of over 1.5 million taxpayers, more than half of which are classified 
as inactive (Mayega et al. 2019). Some focus should be dedicated to understanding which of 
the many inactive taxpayers are worth chasing, and which should simply be deregistered as 
they will be unlikely to ever have a positive liability. It also remains particularly hard to access 
taxpayers’ information from third parties, especially from land registry, utilities and 
commercial banks (MOFPED 2019). Initial attempts to obtain access to citizens banking data 
were blocked due to popular and high-level political resistance, as the URA’s right to access 
relevant banking information, granted under the Income Tax Act, was deemed weaker than 
Bank of Uganda guidelines on consumer protection. Similar political interference has also 
materialised against attempts to recover tax arrears (Waiswa et al. 2020). Enforcement 
actions are also made more complex by the general understaffing of the URA, which has a 
taxpayer-to-tax-administrator ratio around three times higher than other African countries 
(Waiswa et al. 2020). It is also generally perceived that not enough attention is directed 
towards compliance from small businesses, as they are often thought not worth the effort of a 
close follow-up. While this might be the case for some businesses added in the most recent 
registration drives, and is understandable given current understaffing, it risks having serious 
consequences to the integrity of the tax system (Waiswa et al. 2020). 
 
In this situation, is there any theoretical or empirical evidence that focusing on the role of tax 
agents might facilitate the resolution of some of these issues, or provide the URA with further 
avenues to improve programmes on which it has already focused? A few things emerge from 
the review in the previous section. First, there is evidence that the URA could engage with 
tax agents for sensitisation drives directed towards taxpayers. They have proved to be more 
effective than general information campaigns in other contexts (Chetty and Saez 2013), and 
their role as information brokers is well recognised (OECD 2008; Hasseldine et al. 2011). 
Secondly, working in conjunction with tax agents could simplify ensuring compliance with 
small businesses. Evidence from a few different HICs indicates that this taxpayer category 
has a preference for conservative advice (Hite et al. 1992; Tan 1999) and for ensuring that 
their returns are correctly compiled (Hite et al. 1992; Tan 1999; Stephenson 2007, 2010; 
Lubbe and Nienaber 2012). Imposing strict requirements for qualification as a tax agent 
could also play a role in improving the quality of returns (McKerchar et al. 2008). However, 
too stringent a regulation might increase the number of taxpayers accessing services of 






4  Current regulation of tax agents in Uganda 
and its potential weaknesses 
 
First, it is worth noting that during the course of this study – and partially due to its role in 
making the issue more prominent within the URA – a series of efforts have been made to 
implement tax agent regulation that already existed in the country more fully, as well as 
making some partial amendments. According to Ugandan law, a tax agent is ‘a person 
engaged inter alia, in preparation, certification, and filing of tax returns, information returns, 
or other statements or reports required by the URA, on behalf of the taxpayer’ (Tax 
Procedures Code Act 2014). In order to regulate the conduct of tax agents and enhance the 
accuracy of tax returns filed by taxpayers, the Tax Procedures Code Act also mandated that 
tax agents who assist taxpayers in preparing tax returns be vetted and accredited by the Tax 
Agents Registration Committee (TARC). The requirement for registration as a tax agent is 
completion of tertiary education in a ‘discipline which is relevant for the provision of tax 
services’, the successful completion ‘of a course in taxation recognised by TARC’, or having 
had two years of ‘full time tax-practice’ experience during the five years preceding the 
coming into force of the act (Tax Procedures Code Act 2014). The Act does not specify what 
the relevant disciplines are, what type of courses have to be recognised by TARC, nor what 
is intended by ‘full time tax practice’, and no practice note has ever been directed to the 
issue. Work on the effect of regulation of agents stressed that very stringent entry 
requirements might lead to an increase in aggressive tax advice (Ayres et al. 1989; Erard 
1993), but that some minimum standards are required to improve the quality of returns 
(McKerchar et al. 2008). It is not exactly clear where in the spectrum the current 
requirements lie, but it seems more likely that they might fail to improve quality rather than 
increase aggressiveness of tax reporting.  
 
The Tax Procedures Code Act only came into force in July 2016 following the promulgation 
of a dedicated statutory instrument by the Minister of Finance; it took more time to appoint 
the member of the TARC, which was inaugurated in May 2017. The registration of the first 
tax agents, requiring an initial non-refundable payment of USh200,000,8 followed by a further 
USh500,000 upon approval, started soon afterwards. By the end of December 2017 289 
agents had been accredited to practice the following year. Due to the novelty of the process, 
both the submission and the vetting of documents required for accreditation was done 
manually. This proved to be particularly cumbersome, and partially explains why the number 
of tax agents approved for 2019 decreased to 231. To overcome this issue, over the course 
of 2019 both the tax agents’ application process and their nomination by taxpayers were 
automated within e-Tax,9 with the aim of greatly simplifying both. However, different IT 
challenges on the URA side led to the opposite result: only 34 taxpayers managed to 
nominate tax agents, and the accreditation process was so disrupted that it had to be 
suspended altogether.10 As a consequence, no tax agent was accredited for 2020 – all 
applications were carried forward for consideration over the following year, and all of those 
who applied where automatically granted the permit to operate as agents. 
 
In-depth interviews with three members of TARC conducted in early 2020 revealed they are 
all strongly convinced about the usefulness of the current URA policy, although they would 
 
8 The exchange rate in 2017 was US$1 = UGSh3,611 (World Bank Development Indicators). 
9  e-Tax is the integrated tax administration system currently in use in Uganda.  
10  These IT failures also made it impossible to rely on the e-Tax system to obtain data for this research, as only 34 
taxpayers had nominated their agents before nominations were suspended. It must be noted that the current set-up of 
e-Tax does not explicitly distinguish between returns submitted by agents and those submitted by taxpayers, as the 
former are allowed to file using the latter’s TIN. While this issue is currently being addressed, it meant we could not 
proceed with any quantitative comparison of the impact of agents on the quality of returns. 
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appreciate stricter enforcement, as well as some revision, of the current regulation. Their 
positive view of the policy is due to it being more cost-effective to engage with a small group 
of agents than with the large number of taxpayers who rely on their services. If the regulation 
were fully implemented, the overall effect would be positive for both taxpayers and the URA – 
the former would be more confident about engaging a professional whose expertise had 
been vetted, and the latter would receive returns of a higher quality. 
 
However, they also generally take issue with current management of the registration and 
nomination process. Apart from recognising the impact that the glitches in the IT system had 
on taxpayers’ capacity to nominate agents, their biggest problem is with the vetting process 
and qualification requirements. This is because the process of verifying information 
submitted by agents with various vetting bodies is lengthy when they are based in Uganda, 
and very challenging to bring to completion when they are based outside it. Other issues 
mentioned are availability of information on criminal backgrounds from Ugandan law 
enforcement agencies, as well as the complexity of verifying agents’ previous work 
experience as they previously operated in an unregulated environment. Furthermore, they 
have also realised that even when tax agents meet all the necessary requirements and 
possess the right academic qualifications, this is no guarantee that they will have the actual 
skills required for the work, since there is no examination in order to become an agent. 
 
Some also find other aspects of the Tax Procedure Code Act problematic. It requires all 
taxpayers with a turnover above USh500 million to have a financial statement audited by a 
member of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU) accompanying 
their tax return.11 They believe that so far this provision has not had an impact on the quality 
of tax declarations, given that it is often not enforced. Even when it is, the URA does not 
have any control over the standard required to be a member of ICPAU. However, this was 
not a unified position within TARC. Other members suggested reviewing the current 
regulation and lowering the qualification requirement to include Accounting Technicians and 
Certified Tax Advisor trainees from ICPAU. Both of these are widely available, and should be 
capable of managing tax affairs with some further training. Hence, there seems to be some 
tension between different members on the current relationship between the URA and ICPAU, 
which might warrant further consideration for the future. 
 
All interviewees were convinced of the usefulness of designing and offering regular training 
to tax agents, with the aim of understanding their challenges and increasing their 
competence. Another common recommendation was for the URA to push for an amendment 
of the law, to make it compulsory for an accountant signing a taxpayer’s return to be their 
nominated – and registered – tax agent. They were also convinced that taxpayers above the 
USh500 million threshold who fail to nominate a tax agent in time should be heavily 
penalised, to potentially incentivise compliance with this rule. 
 
 
5  URA tax officer and tax agent survey results 
 
In this section, we present the results of two exploratory surveys aimed at acquiring some 
initial evidence on URA tax officers’ perception of the role and quality of tax agents, and on 
the latter’s perceptions of their relationship with their clients. One of the authors emailed the 
first survey to a sample of 158 URA tax officers, representative of the 321 compliance staff 
working at the URA headquarters in March 2020; 81 of these returned a completed 
questionnaire. The second was a self-administered questionnaire, which was completed by 
 
11  The ICPAU is Uganda’s regulatory body for accountants.  
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204 tax agents who attended a series of workshops at the URA between the end of October 
and early November 2020. A couple of limitations in our data need to be discussed before 
looking at the results. First, both sets of questionnaires were self-administered, and there 
was no chance to look into in-depth explanation of each question and potential answers. 
Therefore, it might be that nuances between different multiple choice options – such as 
complexity of general tax obligations or complexity of the return form itself – might have been 
lost on responders. To this end, where appropriate, we aggregate answers together into one 
logical overarching category. Secondly, there were instances where, despite being requested 
to select only one answer, more than one was indicated. In these cases, only questionnaires 
where answers were given according to the instructions are reported. Third, two of the 
questions included in the tax agents’ questionnaire asked them to provide an explicit ranking 
of different options – many respondents ignored this, simply ticking all that applied. For those 
answers, the ranked answers are reported separately from the unranked ones. Finally, we 
could not ensure that sampled individuals were representative of the whole population. As 
this study is intended to provide a first set of evidence and guide future work, these issues 
should not make the answers less indicative of general trends. 
 
5.1 Survey of URA tax officers 
 
As seen in Table.1, respondents from the URA came from all the different departments that 
manage taxpayer compliance. The majority of those who returned a completed questionnaire 
worked in offices that only deal with taxpayers after they have filed a return - all but the 
respondents from the Medium and the Large Taxpayer Offices. With the originally sampled 
respondents, there is a higher representation of officers managing large taxpayers (29.6% of 
respondents vs. 18.9% of the sample), and a lower representation of those working on 
revenue assurance (23.5% of respondents vs. 34.8% of the sample).12 Consequently, if the 
views amongst these two categories are significantly different, our results will be 
unrepresentative of the URA position. However, the only two variables for which response 
patterns are significantly different are those on frequency of tax agent use amongst 
taxpayers and tax agents’ knowledge. Unsurprisingly, tax officers from the Large Taxpayer 
Office are both more likely to state that most of their clients use a tax agent, and that tax 
agents are knowledgeable or very knowledgeable about the tax system. Therefore, with this 
caveat in mind, the following responses should still provide a fair representation of the 
opinion of tax officers of tax agents. 
 
It might also be reasonable to assume that perceptions of the role and capacity of tax agents 
differ between officers dealing with taxpayers before their returns are submitted, and those 
dealing with them afterwards. Hence, a test of systematic differences in response across 
these two categories was performed for most of the questions in the survey.13 Comments will 
mostly be made when these differences are significant. Officers from the Medium and Large 
Taxpayer Offices will be referred to as ‘pre-filing’, the others as ‘post-filing’.  
     
  
 
12  The average difference between sample and respondents for all other categories of respondents is 3.7%. 
13  As all responses to questions in these section are from categorical or ordinal variables, systematic differences for the 
latter have been verified with Mann-Whitney U test, and for the former through Fisher’s exact test.  
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Table 1 Assigned office of URA respondents 
  Frequency Percentage 
Large Taxpayers Office 24 29.63 
Medium Taxpayers Office 7 8.64 
Objection and Appeals Office 5 6.17 
Refunds Office 13 16.05 
Revenue Assurance Office 19 23.46 
Tax Examination Office 13 16.05 
Total 81 100 
 
Given that the use of tax agents is in no way mandatory, it is not surprising to find almost the 
totality (93.8%) of URA staff surveyed agree that there are taxpayers who are not using their 
services. However, the majority of tax officers surveyed (64.2%) state that most of the 
taxpayers they handle use a tax agent. As there is no difference in the pattern of responses 
between staff in pre- and post-filing offices, this phenomenon seems to be widespread. 
When asked about the timeliness of declarations and the quality of returns from taxpayers 
who take care of their tax obligation autonomously, the majority of URA staff find them to be 
on average with the general taxpayer population. However, opinions about timeliness 
significantly differ between staff in pre- and post-filing offices, with those working in post-filing 
stating that taxpayers with agents are less likely to be on time. When directly asked if the use 
of tax agents makes it more likely that returns will be filed late, 40.5 per cent of respondents 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed, about the same as those who either agreed or 
strongly agreed with it (36.7%). 
 
Unsurprisingly, when staff are asked to express a judgement on tax knowledge of both tax 
agents and taxpayers, measured on a 4-point Likert scale, tax agents are twice as likely to 
be considered ‘Knowledgeable’ or ‘Very knowledgeable’ – the upper half of the scale – as 
taxpayers. However, two things must also be noted. First, 55.6 per cent of URA staff still rate 
tax agents’ knowledge in the lower half of the scale. Second, staff in post-filing offices are 
significantly more likely to have a low opinion of tax agents’ knowledge than those in pre-
filing offices. This seems to indicate that, similarly to the TARC interviewees, URA staff have 
a mixed opinion on the level of preparation of tax agents. 
 
Table 2 URA staff opinion on tax agent and taxpayer knowledge  
Tax knowledge Tax agents Taxpayers 
Not knowledgeable 1 12 
Somewhat knowledgeable 44 49 
Knowledgeable 35 19 
Very knowledgeable 1 0 
Total 81 80 
 
When asked what are the most likely reasons leading a taxpayer to use a tax agent, the most 
frequent answer from URA staff is that the tax system is too complex for taxpayers to deal 
with on their own (42.86%). This is followed by wanting to adequately respond to a 
compliance query (36.51%), with only 7.94 per cent answering that taxpayers are looking for 
tax planning. These answers are coherent with those to the questions of which tax agent 
services are most frequently requested by taxpayers. In this case, preparation and filing of 
tax returns is the most frequent answer (38.27%), followed by preparation and auditing of 
financial accounts (30.86%), and representing their clients before the URA (23.46%). Overall, 
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54.2 per cent of surveyed staff either agree or strongly agree that use of tax agents is an 
unavoidable consequence of a tax system strongly reliant on self-assessment. No significant 
difference emerges between opinions of staff in pre- and post-filing offices for any of the 
above answers. These findings resonate with another work that flagged the overall 
complexity of the Ugandan tax system (Waiswa et al. 2020), with studies indicating that a 
general willingness to comply with their obligation is the prevailing reason for taxpayers to 
hire professional tax agents (Hite et al. 1992; Tan 1999; Lubbe and Nienaber 2012), and that 
tax agents are relevant in URA-taxpayers interactions (Mayega et al. 2019).  
 
More questions were asked to obtain a better picture of these latter interactions. Almost 70 
per cent of survey respondents agreed that taxpayers are not confident in responding to 
queries from the URA on their own, which probably explains why 72.8 per cent of staff think 
that tax agents do not allow their clients to interface with the URA on their own. However, 
43.2 per cent of URA staff also find it either difficult or very difficult to solve compliance 
issues without the involvement of tax agents (against 40.7% who find it easy or very easy). 
Taken together, these answers imply that tax agents acting as intermediaries between URA 
and taxpayers is convenient for both parties. Hence, tax agent involvement might have more 
to do with the complexity of the Ugandan tax system – or with perceptions of potential 
unfairness from URA officials – than with a desire from tax agents to maintain complete 
control over their clients’ tax issues. 
 
A final set of questions aimed to understand the impact of tax agents on returns’ quality and 
compliance risk. The vast majority of URA staff think that use of tax agents does sometimes 
increase the quality of returns (77.2%), with another 19 per cent stating that it always does 
so. The above is coherent with the fact that 29.1 per cent of respondents maintain that 
returns completed by tax agents still have computational mistakes, against 43 per cent that 
disagree with the statement. Returns prepared by tax agents are still considered risky from a 
compliance point of view by 36.25 per cent of surveyed staff, although 62.5 per cent find 
them less risky than those self-prepared. Self-prepared returns are considered risky by 76.5 
per cent of respondents, and less risky than those submitted with an agent only by 22.2 per 
cent. It seems that, despite a somewhat mixed opinion on tax agents’ preparedness, staff 
from the URA think that their use also contributes to improving the overall quality of returns 
submitted. This is confirmed by the fact that 43.2 per cent of respondents agreed that returns 
prepared by agents lead to less audit adjustments. 
 
5.2 Survey of tax agents 
 
The questionnaire submitted to tax agents aimed to gather information about the market in 
which URA-accredited tax agents operate, and the type of services they more often provide 
to their clients. The ‘accredited’ qualification is relevant, as there might be a variety of other 
actors in the Ugandan agents’ market who have not yet sought accreditation from the URA, 
and who might exhibit different characteristics than those surveyed at the workshop. Similarly 
to the previous section, answers to particular questions lent themselves to test if significant 
systematic differences could be individuated across different categories of agents, such as 
self-employed or employees, and those with or without a professional association.14  
 
First, almost 60 per cent of the 204 tax agents who took part in the URA workshops were 
self-employed, with the remainder working as employees. Given the registration 
requirements discussed in section 3, it is not surprising to find that only 18 did not possess a 
university degree, with an undergraduate degree being the most common qualification (136 
 
14  As in the previous section, systematic differences across ordinal variables have been tested with Mann-Whitney test 
and differences across categorical variables have been tested through Fisher’s exact test, while differences across 
percentages with t-tests. 
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respondents). Slightly more than half of the respondents (56.4%) also have some form of 
professional association, with the Institute of Certified Public Accountant of Uganda being the 
most common one (78.3% of those with an affiliation). The relative majority (37.2%) first 
sought accreditation for 2018 – the first year TARC ran background checks – while another 
35.1 per cent attempted to register after the Tax Procedures Code Act was passed in 2014. 
Moreover, 27.7 per cent claimed to have tried even before that – predominantly self-
employed tax agents. The majority of tax agents meets their clients more than once a month 
(62.2%), around a quarter once a month (22.9%), while there are also some for whom tax 
consultancy happens less frequently – every three months (6.4%) or once a year (8.5%). 
 
Coming to the characteristics of their clients, the average share of incorporated clients 
(68.9%) is much higher than individual clients (29.6%), with only 19.9 per cent of 
respondents having a majority of individual clients. The use of tax agents seems to happen 
across all taxpayers’ sizes, with small taxpayers representing on average almost half of tax 
agents’ clients (46.4%), and medium taxpayers around another third (30.3%). Agents for 
whom incorporated clients are the majority are also more likely to have a majority of clients 
qualifying as medium or large taxpayers. No other significant difference in client 
characteristics was found across any other tax agent characteristic. While the above does 
not provide any indication of the prevalence of use of tax agents, it provides some evidence 
that the phenomenon has some relevance, as clients fall in all taxpayer categories both by 
size and incorporation status. 
 
Table 3 Size of client of tax agents 
  Average No clients in category 
Micro taxpayers 14.61% 36.06% 
Small taxpayers 46.42% 4.92% 
Medium taxpayers 30.25% 15.3% 
Large taxpayers 8.72% 51.37% 
  
With regard to the most frequently requested services, about half of respondents (50.4%) did 
not provide the ranking requested in the questionnaire (most frequent, 2nd most frequent, 3rd 
most frequent), but instead ticked all of those that were frequently requested. These 
responses still provide a useful indication of the type of services frequently provided, even if 
they do not technically represent a valid answer to the question. We have therefore decided 
to present both the valid and non-valid answers, in order to give the most complete picture 
possible. Table 4 presents the valid ranking of available answers. Preparation and auditing of 
accounts is generally one of the most requested services, as is the preparation and filing of 
returns. Representation before the URA and determination of tax liability, although not 
frequently the most requested service, are also functions that agents regularly perform for 
their clients. The unranked answers, presented in Table 5, show a very similar pattern. 
Preparation and filing of returns is the most frequently selected service, followed by 
representation in front of the URA and preparation or auditing of accounts. No significant 





Table 4 Frequency of service provision, ranked answers 
Service Most frequent 2nd  3rd 
Preparation and filing of returns 54.64% 30.43% 6.59% 
Preparation or auditing of account 27.84% 27.17% 9.89% 
Representation before the URA 6.19% 20.65% 38.46% 
Determination of tax liability 6.19% 10.87% 17.58% 
Interpreting legislation 2.06% 6.52% 16.48% 
Consultation on legislative changes 1.03% 4.35% 7.69% 
Representation in court of law  2.06% 0.00% 3.30% 
 
Table 5 Frequently requested services, unranked answers 
Service Frequency 
Preparation and filing of returns 22.98% 
Representation before the URA 19.04% 
Preparation or auditing of account 16.41% 
Determination of tax liability 14.00% 
Interpreting legislation 12.04% 
Consultation on legislative changes 9.85% 
Representation in court of law 5.69% 
 
We also asked tax agents what they thought were the most frequent reasons for their clients 
engaging their services. As with the previous case, a significant share of respondents 
(43.04%) did not provide the ranking as requested but simply ticked all those that applied, 
and once again we present both valid and non-valid answers. Table 6 presents the ranked 
answers. As the table shows, the three most frequent answers are lack of tax knowledge, the 
desire to submit error-free returns, and the complexity of tax laws. All these answers seem to 
confirm that a general willingness to comply with tax legislation is a more important incentive 
to seek advice from an agent than reduction of tax liability, which is only mentioned by a 
minority of respondents. As before, the frequency of unranked answers closely follows that of 
ranked ones (Table 5).  
 
Table 6 Frequency of reasons for being hired, ranked answers 
Reason to hire Most frequent 2nd  3rd 
Lack of tax knowledge 64.08% 11.46% 4.60% 
Decreasing chances of errors in returns 12.62% 29.17% 27.59% 
Complexity of tax law 8.74% 25.00% 12.64% 
External opinion on tax matter 4.85% 8.33% 19.54% 
Reduction of liability 4.85% 11.46% 13.79% 
Cost effectiveness of agent service 4.85% 9.38% 8.05% 




Table 7 Frequent reasons for being hired, unranked answers 
Reason to hire Frequency 
Lack of internal tax knowledge 22.84% 
Decreases chances of errors in returns 19.54% 
Complexity of tax law 13.96% 
External opinion on tax matter 12.94% 
Cost effectiveness of agent service 11.93% 
Reduction of audit probability 10.66% 
Reduction of liability 8.12% 
 
Pulling together the evidence from the last two questions, it seems that Ugandan taxpayers 
mostly refer to their tax agents to ensure that they are properly understanding and complying 
with their tax obligations, a finding that resonates with the literature for HICs (Hite et al. 1992; 
Tan 1999; Stephenson 2007, 2010; Lubbe and Nienaber 2012). While reducing liability is 
requested, it is a much less frequent reason to engage tax agents, again resonating with 
findings in the literature (Sakurai and Braithwaite 2003). Furthermore, this provides further 
evidence of the fact that the Ugandan tax system remains complex to understand for many 
taxpayers, and that there is further scope to work on outreach activities (Waiswa et al. 2020).  
 
Agents were also asked if they believe that their services led to an increase, a decrease, or 
had no impact on their clients’ tax liability, and more than three-quarters of respondents 
stated that it led to an increase (76.57%). This answer could be due to two different factors – 
tax agents were responding to the questionnaire during a training session run by the URA, 
which might have had an impact on the picture they wanted to provide. Alternatively, the 
Ugandan tax system might not provide much room for ambiguity, and tax agents might have 
resolved easy-to-detect non-compliance that their clients might have previously included in 
their returns. Considering the frequency with which the complexity of the tax system is 
highlighted, the first reason seems more likely than the second, but this will remain 
impossible to quantitatively verify until the e-Tax system is amended to allow the 
identification of agents submitting returns.  
 
Around three-quarters of tax agents had clients subjected to audits (72.5%), with 20 per cent 
stating that this happens often or very often. The latter finding is explained by comments 
made in some of the URA staff responses, which revealed that if a few returns prepared by 
the same agent were found to have similar discrepancies, then all returns prepared by that 
agent would be audited – a perfectly logical approach from a compliance risk perspective. 
Somehow unsurprisingly, almost all (98.04%) agents thought that their services helped their 
clients increase their understanding of tax matters. The majority of agents (63.13%) indicated 
that their clients were somewhat knowledgeable about tax law, and more than a quarter that 
they are knowledgeable (28.79%). Finally, there is an almost even split between agents 
indicating that their clients would not feel confident in responding to a query from the URA 
without consulting them first (51.74%), and those indicating instead that their clients would be 
(48.26%) – corroborating the answers provided by URA staff. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Over the last 40 years there has been an increased focus on the role that tax agents play in 
ensuring or deterring compliance with tax obligations. This body of work provides enough 
evidence to derive a series of conclusions. First, it is accepted that tax agents ensure that 
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their clients follow unambiguous tax rules to the letter, but they also exploit ambiguities in tax 
laws to minimise liabilities when possible. The degree to which they are successful in doing 
so depends on their qualifications, as agents who can shield their clients from penalties with 
limited professional consequences are more likely to take more aggressive stances. From 
the taxpayer point of view, reducing the risk of penalties and probability of audit seem to be 
the main reasons to employ tax agents. Although decreasing tax liabilities is also a sought-
after service, there is evidence that taxpayers prefer conservative over aggressive advice on 
reducing liability in the majority of cases. However, those who have a greater risk appetite 
generally find tax agents who can satisfy their requests, although the latter may draw a line 
as to how much non-compliance they will support. 
 
The majority of the above evidence has been obtained from high-income countries, with only 
a few studies assessing the role of tax agents in upper-middle-income contexts. Given that 
tax systems in low-income countries tend to exhibit significant differences from those of high- 
and upper-middle-income ones, it is worth investigating if the use of tax agents is as 
widespread, and if their effect is comparable. This is especially relevant given that resolving 
a variety of non-compliance issues is often one of the main obstacles to increasing domestic 
resource mobilisation in those countries. 
 
We have presented some initial evidence on the characteristics of the market for tax agents 
in Uganda, how the URA perceives their role, and which regulative approach has been 
taken, by means of two surveys and various in-depth interviews. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time that this topic has been explored in a lower-income country 
setting. While our surveys are not likely to be representative, they provide initial support to 
the hypothesis that tax agents play a similar role in the Ugandan context as they do in high-
income country settings.  
 
Tax agents provide their services to all types of taxpayers – both corporations and 
individuals, whether they are micro, small, medium or large taxpayers. Their clients seem to 
seek their services due to difficulties with both understanding and complying with their tax 
obligations - reduction of liabilities is generally a much less important reason to seek the 
services of an agents. Accordingly, their most requested services are preparation and filing 
of returns, as well as preparation and auditing of financial accounts, with tax minimisation 
being a much less frequent request.  
 
Staff from the URA seem to have mixed opinions on the usefulness of tax agents. They 
consider them more knowledgeable than taxpayers, but not at the level that one would 
expect. While they recognise that agents generally improve the quality of tax returns, around 
a third of respondents flagged that they also make computational mistakes, and agent-
prepared returns are often filed late. Regardless, they still consider returns prepared by tax 
agents less risky than those self-prepared by taxpayers, and they recognise that audit 
adjustments are smaller when tax agents are in charge of return preparation.  
 
Our results have a series of policy implications, as they demonstrate that a variety of different 
taxpayer categories use agents’ services, so that interacting with agents could be a further 
strategy for the URA to reach taxpayers. This interaction could go both ways – agents could 
relay to the URA which provisions are harder for taxpayers to cope with, and the URA relay 
to agents its position on more ambiguous tax rulings. Interviews with the Tax Agent 
Regulation Committee (TARC) revealed the complexity of setting up a regulated framework 
for the accreditation of tax agents, and some potential issues with the current regulation of 
entry-level requirements and who should be using a tax agent. 
 
 27 
Some reform of the regulations is currently taking place. The TARC has drafted a policy 
proposal to be included in the 2021/2022 tax policy amendments, prescribing penalties for 
agents providing assistance to taxpayers without formal accreditation, and for agents 
influencing taxpayers into acts of malpractice. As the literature shows that regulation of 
agents has an impact on their service provision, these reforms could limit particular 
detrimental behaviour from agents. However, other weaknesses of the current regulation of 
agents, especially their required qualifications, seem not to have been addressed. Similarly, 
a system is being set up to enable tracking of information relating to the performance of tax 
agents, who will from now on file returns on their clients’ behalf from a separate account. 
Thanks to this development, it will soon be possible to rely on tax returns to verify some of 
the claims made by both URA staff and agents themselves. These include the frequency of 
mistakes in agent-prepared returns, as well as their relative compliance risk, audit 
adjustment, frequency of late filing and differences in liability. It could also be of interest to 
obtain information on the use of tax agents from taxpayers themselves. This could not be 
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